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One of the most widely watched debates in legal theory today concerns
whether genuine political community is possible in light of the law's ap-
parent indeterminacy. Not only has this debate occupied skeptics within
the profession, such as the members of the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment (CLS), but even a bastion of the liberal establishment like Ronald
Dworkin has been pushed to make the tension between community and
indeterminacy the focal point of Law's Empire, a book intended for a gen-
eral, philosophically literate audience." As the debate has been played out
in the law journals, the partisans have marshaled an ever-increasing num-
ber of allies from outside the legal profession, especially from the philoso-
phy of science. However, one party quite prominent among philosophers
of science has been conspicuously absent from this debate, namely, the
scientific realist. I shall argue that, in neglecting the scientific realist, le-
gal theorists have failed to come to grips with the central role that cogni-
tive limitations play in legal reasoning.
An exemplary round of the debate in question was recently conducted
by Joseph Singer, a CLS sympathizer, and John Stick, a defender of the
liberal order." Both theorists take comfort in the idea that the law is a
product of human decisionmaking. Whereas Singer infers from this idea
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the conclusion that the law is always open to change as each generation of
decisionmakers sees fit, Stick infers that it is within the power of succes-
sive generations of decisionmakers to uphold the same laws (or at least the
same values expressed by those laws), thereby allowing a lasting political
community to form. Notice that both Singer and Stick presume that the
law is under the cognitive and practical control of humans-perhaps in a
way that most "naturally occurring" (i.e. non-human) phenomena are
not-precisely because it is a creation of humans.
But is the presumption a sound one? Far from being merely a philoso-
pher's question, this one goes to the heart of contemporary legal theory, in
particular to the multi-volume project, Politics: A Work in Constructive
Social Theory, that has been undertaken by Roberto Unger.' Unger quite
explicitly starts with the premise that the social order is either natural and
(therefore) beyond human control or created and (therefore) within
human control. Unger's mission is to demonstrate that the latter is the
case, despite the efforts of political and scientific authoritarians to show
otherwise.
4
By contrast, a legal theorist influenced by scientific realism would see
Unger's premise as harboring a false dichotomy. She would observe that
the consequences of, say, legal decisionmaking are in principle no more
and no less under our control than the effects of some non-human cause.
In both cases, our judgment is fallible, even to the point of conceptualizing
the relevant phenomena in highly misleading categories that deny us the
predictive and explanatory power we seek. Every so often, the scientific
realist tells us, inquirers become especially self-conscious about this point
and radically shift their categorical framework in order to correct their
erroneous ways; hence, the scientific revolutions of Newton over Aristotle
and (more interesting for our own purposes) Marx over Smith and Ri-
cardo. Each revolution is the unanticipated, and often unintended, conse-
quence of inquirers pursuing normal science in the old paradigm and run-
3. Three volumes have already been published: R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND
ITS TASK (1987); FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF
RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL STUDIES ON
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS (1987).
4. Unger acknowledges the major emancipatory role played by liberalism and Marxism in high-
lighting the constructed character of society. R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 1-10.
However, as Unger reads the history of the last two centuries, once these political doctrines suffered
significant practical setbacks, both theorists and politicians fell back on the idea that society had a life
of its own, subject to a narrow range of possible changes, and was thus not amenable to voluntarily
undertaken collective action. In this way, then, Unger believes that what he calls "positivism"
(roughly, the attempt to study social phenomena as if they were natural) has conspired with atavistic
forms of authoritarianism to convince people that there is little they can do to improve their situation.
Against these efforts to undermine substantial political action, Unger argues that the reason liberalism
and Marxism failed was not that they neglected certain intractable facts about the nature of society,
but rather that they did not conceive of society as being within the control of its members. Unger
intends his argument to have special relevance to the political options available to third world coun-
tries, particularly his native Brazil, where-it is rumored-he plans to return upon the completion of
Politics, to work as a political activist.
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ning across too many intractable anomalies along the way: once again,
human agency is in less than full control of the consequences of its own
activity.5
When the paradigm is not only human in origin, but also in object and
in application, the stakes may be sufficiently high to inhibit the inquirer
from admitting that there are persistent anomalies. As the scientific realist
sees it, the ease with which legal theories can function as establish-
mentarian ideologies-even if it is of a liberal establishment-makes them
especially ripe for this sort of diagnosis. Without yet having examined
Singer and Stick in detail, the realist can already detect the potential
sources of rationalization and systematic self-deception in the contempo-
rary legal theory debates. For his part, Singer draws our attention away
from the diverse social consequences of implementing a legal decision back
to the intentional states of the original decisionmakers, while Stick con-
verts the history of divergent and often conflicting political traditions in
this country into a story of one dominant (and highly reasonable) liberal
voice with several distinctly lesser voices in the background.'
5. The language here is, of course, taken from T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REvoLuTioN (2d ed. 1970). The interpretation, however, is not so much Kuhn's own but that of his
principal interlocutor, Karl Popper, who explains the possibility of objective knowledge in terms of
our unintentionally generating problems in the course of pursuing our ends. See K. POPPER, OBJEC-
TIVE KNOWLEDGE 106-90 (1972); Popper, The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions, in SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 80 (I. Hacking ed. 1981).
To understand the implications of this deeper sense of human cognitive fallibility for philosophy of
science, consider how one might go about explaining the connection between a theory's truth and its
acceptance by one or more scientific communities. Since these contexts of acceptance are generally
embedded in rather diverse social circumstances, philosophers are inclined to suppose that the theory
must have some content or truth that remains invariant across these circumstances. Moreover, philoso-
phers normally assume that invariance of this sort is necessary for the transmission and growth of
knowledge. However, all this talk of "invariance" and "continuity" typically confuses the relatively
uncontroversial claim that the truth itself does not change with the highly dubious claim that the truth
is transmitted intact by reliable linguistic means. Indeed, if it can be shown that the linguistic means
at our disposal for transmitting truths are less than reliable, then whatever invariance we seem to find
in scientific theories accepted across many socio-historical contexts (e.g., Newtonian mechanics and
Darwinian biology) cannot be due to the invariant nature of the truth transmitted, but is rather due to
institutionalized cognitive mechanisms that suppress the differences in interpretation that would have
naturally resulted from the theory being unreliably transmitted.
In short, then, a theory's truth cannot be the best explanation for its acceptance because such an
explanation falsely presupposes that theory can be transmitted intact to the various contexts required
for acceptance. Combine this argument with a general acceptance of scientific realism, and the para-
dox becomes clear: the most persuasive grounds for realism are themselves an artifact of our cognitive
fallibility, the depth of which would not have been realized had we not already been committed to
realism, and hence to a principled distinction between reality and our knowledge of it.
6. The sort of rationalization attributed here to Singer and Stick is known to Marxists as the
reification of history, which involves imputing undue continuity between the past and present, usually
for the purpose of legitimation. The locus classicus of Marxist discussions of reification is G.
LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83-222 (1972). As we shall see in more detail later,
Singer accounts for decisionmaking from a purely personalistic standpoint, frequently asking the
reader to empathize with what must be going through the judge's mind. See Singer, supra note 2, at
65. The persuasiveness of such an appeal rests on the presumption that there is at least some ground-
level sense of continuity in how people throughout history have experienced the exigencies of the
human condition. And while Stick does not adopt the personalistic perspective, he too characterizes
legal history as if it had some unfolding purpose, such as the realization of liberal values. But this is
not to say that all recent legal theorists reify history. Some are self-conscious about reification and
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So far, a reader with a good ear for the philosophical resonances in the
recent legal theory debates will have heard some familiar sounds. Indeed,
in delivering her preliminary diagnosis, our scientific realist sounds very
much like the sort of Marxist or deconstructionist on whose authority
many CLS partisans seem to rely. As I will show in the next section,
however, the critical potential of these authorities is not fully realized by
operating within what philosophers today call the antirealist framework
shared by Singer and Stick. The particular brand of scientific realism that
will be presented goes beyond simply postulating a distinction between the
world and how we think about it. It also recognizes a difference between
our own social constructions and how we think about them.
After showing how a recognition of this difference would alleviate much
of Singer's and Stick's inclarity about the nature of indeterminacy in legal
decisionmaking, I will draw on recent psychology and sociology of science
to identify institutionalized cognitive mechanisms that cause us to suppress
any awareness of just how fallible and generally divergent human judg-
ment really is. Finally, I will examine the implications that all this has for
political metatheory.
I. THE NEED FOR AND NEGLECT OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
The easiest way to demonstrate the neglect of scientific realism in the
recent legal theory debates is by recounting Singer's own characterization
of the three main parties to these debates. The rationalists, with whom
Stick identifies, explicitly trace the legitimacy of a legal system to some
consensually endorsed foundations, which normally turn out to be a
method for determining how a judge ought to rule in specific cases (which
is often cast in terms of the judge's ability to secure a determinate mean-
ing from the body of law). Nihilists, the hard-core of CLS, argue that
legal systems lack the sort of foundations sought by rationalists and, on
that basis, conclude that all such systems are illegitimate. Finally, the ir-
rationalists, with whom Singer identifies, deny the connection between
legitimacy and consensual foundations-but only to assert in its place the
role that personal knowledge plays in undergirding the legal system.1 All
three of these positions are antirealist because their proponents presup-
pose that it makes no sense to say that a statement is "true" or "false"
("right" or "wrong") unless there is a way of showing that it is one or the
other. Rationalists and irrationalists differ over whether the relevant mode
of "showing" is communal or personal, while nihilists fail to find any
such mode and thereby deny the legitimacy of any legal system.
A tell-tale sign of the antirealism of the three positions is that they all
approach the writing of history with a deconstructive attitude. An exemplary case is Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
7. See Singer, supra note 2, at 3-5; Stick, supra note 2, at 332-38.
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take the perspective of an insider to the legal system in question. This
point is perhaps clearest in the cases of the rationalist and the irrational-
ist, who are clearly arguing over whether the legal decisionmaker needs to
go beyond his own conscience to authorize his decision. But the point also
applies to the nihilist. After all, nihilism does not merely require the deci-
sionmaker to realize that all the available modes of legitimation are fun-
damentally false, but it also requires that she draw two further conclu-
sions, namely, (1) that the situation would not improve by the
introduction of new modes of legitimation, and (2) that this irremediable
illegitimacy leaves the legal system without proper guidance. We see,
then, that the nihilist uses her knowledge of the current legal possibilities
as the measure of legal reality, which is in step with the antirealist ten-
dency to make verifiability constitutive of validity (or truth). In other
words, since the nihilist cannot specify any adequate conditions for legal
verification, she infers that the idea of legal validity has been completely
undermined.'
By contrast, a legal theorist influenced by scientiiic realism would re-
fuse to draw the nihilist's two conclusions, asserting instead the conceptual
independence of validity from verifiability. As a result, he would counter
the nihilist by arguing that there may indeed be a way of legitimating
legal decisions, but it would involve going outside the decisionmaker's cur-
rent conceptual framework-perhaps even to the point of radically recon-
ceiving the relations between the intentions and the consequences of his
decisions. Moreover, even if this better framework is only dimly perceived
at present, that fact alone is not enough to detract from the legitimacy of
the legal decisions currently being made. To think otherwise would be like
envisaging that people moved about the earth less assuredly before they
knew what kept them from flying off its face. Of course, once Newtonian
mechanics was known, it became possible to control and extend human
motion in ways that were previously inconceivable by, for example, sys-
tematically compensating for the effects of gravity. Similarly, in the case of
the law, a comprehensive explanatory and predictive theory of judicial
decisionmaking would provide the means by which decisions in the future
could be made to have a more desirable impact on the social order.
Clearly, then, the legal theorist influenced by scientific realism speaks as
an outsider to the legal system under study, holding out the possibility
that there is a way of understanding the system that is better than any
insider's.9
8. A fascinating history of the influence of nihilism on continental European jurisprudence over
the last century is G. RosE, DIALECTIC OF NIHILISM: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND THE LAW (1984).
9. The difference between insider and outsider perspectives is reminiscent of H.L.A. Hart's dis-
tinction between the internal and external points of view from which a rule-governed practice can be
examined. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-88, 244 (1960). However, my distinctions
are drawn to different effect. Hart is interested in showing that even if the outsider, after sustained
observation of a society's practices, were able to predict its members' behavior, that alone would not be
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If all that was interesting about scientific realism was its opposition to
the viewpoints of the protagonists in the legal theory debates, then a sud-
den injection of realism would do little more than contribute to an idle
sense of completeness. However, scientific realism is interesting for two
more substantial reasons, which we shall consider in turn. First, as a mat-
ter of sociological fact, realism is the dominant position in contemporary
philosophy of science, and its influence has rapidly spread to such seem-
ingly unrelated realms as ethics and aesthetics, which touch on the value
issues directly raised by the philosophy of law.1 ° Indeed, the very name of
the opposing viewpoint, "antirealism," is a recent coinage that reflects the
dialectical disadvantage at which positions formerly known as "idealism"
or "positivism" or "instrumentalism" or "phenomenalism" currently find
themselves.11 The reliance of contemporary legal theorists on the argu-
ments and authority of recent philosophers of science is easy to spot. 2 Yet
sufficient to capture the normative, obligatory, character that they attach to those practices. Hart's
point is that the values which a society invests in its practices cannot be exhaustively captured by a
purely behavioral account. He thus presumes that the (normal) insider's self-understanding establishes
the standard to which the outsider's knowledge aspires. Consequently, Hart does not consider the
possibility that, notwithstanding the values upheld by the insider's understanding of his practices, that
understanding might still not permit the insider to predict and explain his own behavior as well as a
theory scientifically adduced by the outsider. In this way, the outsider may be able to show that the
insider, quite literally, does not know what he is doing. Indeed, as in the case of Marxist theories of
ideology and false consciousness, the particular way in which the insider misunderstands his own
activities may even serve to keep those practices in place and thereby stabilize the power relations of
the society.
10. See, e.g., IMAGES OF SCIENCE (P. Churchland & C. Hooker eds. 1985); See, e.g., SCIETlFIC
REALISM (J. Leplin ed. 1984). For the influence of scientific realism in recent value theory debates,
see MORAL REALISM (N. Gillespie ed. 1986).
Scientific realism gained ascendency in the philosophy of science because it offered a novel and
useful perspective on the problem of incommensurability, which had plagued philosophers since Kuhn
brought it to everyone's attention. The problem arose in this way. We believe that we ought to be able
to say, for example, that Aristotle was wrong about most of the things he said about locomotion.
Antirealists believe our criticism would be justified only if locomotion as a concept exist independently
of the particular languages in which it was described, so it could provide the (implicit) standard
against which descriptions in those languages could be compared.
Kuhn had argued that scientific terms referred only within the conceptual framework in which they
were used, that is, that Aristotle's concept of locomotion could only be understood by recreating Aris-
totle's conceptual framework. See T. KUHN, supra note 5. Kuhn's command to reconstruct Aristotle's
framework implied that we ought not evaluate Aristotle's concept of locomotion in terms of its inade-
quacy within our own conceptual framework. According to Kuhn, then, our criticism of Aristotle was
unwarranted. (The compelling logic of his position had troubled philosophers allied with antirealism.
See, e.g., R. CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY 205-06 (2d ed. 1958) (discussing logical positiv-
ism).) Scientific realists argue that the justifiability of our criticizing Aristotle does not depend upon
our ability to hold our descriptions of locomotion constant across paradigms. In other words, the
realists separate truth from meaning, a move that authorizes criticism of concepts incommensurable
with our own. See supra note 5 (describing realist's denial that continuity of concepts implies con-
tinuity of description).
11. Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett is perhaps the most distinguished contemporary an-
tirealist spokesman. He has been especially sensitive to having to bear the burden of proof. See M.
DUmMErT, TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 145-65 (1977). Contrast this with Ernest Nagel's pre-
sumption that instrumentalism, an antirealist position, had the upper hand. Nagel's view appeared
only a generation ago in the most widely used philosophy of science text of the day. E. NAGEL, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 106-52 (1960).
12. Singer's distinction between rationalism and irrationalism, as well as his advocacy of irration-
alism, is motivated by Richard Rorty's distinction between "normal" and "abnormal" discourses,
1988] Scientific Realism
scientific realists are conspicuous by their absence, either as friends or
foes. This state of affairs cries out for explanation.1 3 Second, the neglect of
scientific realism makes legal theorists oblivious to the liabilities of human
which is, in turn, based on Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science. See R.
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 315-32 (1979); Singer, supra note 2, at 3-5.
In addition to Kuhn, Stick draws on Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, and Ian Hacking to construct a
consensus theory of politics to match the consensualist approach to truth that he sees developing in
their work. See Stick, supra note 2, at 332-38.
13. Ronald Dworkin is one of the few recent legal theorists to have modeled his position on a sort
of realism. However, in the rush to shove Dworkin into the pragmatist melting pot, his fellow legal
theorists have failedL to detect the tell-tale signs of his rather distinctive position. Stick is especially
guilty of this. See Stick, supra note 2, at 376-83; see also Stick, Literary Imperialism: Assessing the
Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in LAW'S EMPIRE, 34 UCLA L. REv. 371 (1986).
Dworkin registers his protests to this "pragmatization" of his work in LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note
1, at 151-75. First, Dworkin fully agrees with Singer and other defenders of CLS that the law has
nothing akin to a verification procedure for judicial decisions, or even standardized definitions of such
key concepts as justice, right, obligation, and even law itself. However, unlike the legal antirealists,
Dworkin does not as a result suddenly lose a sense of the law's objectivity, nor does he imagine that
even antirealist judges lose their intuitions about "better" and "worse" interpretations of cases. In-
deed, the fact that the judge's intuitive sense of interpretive constc-a -its is not undermined by his
failure to codify them suggests to Dworkin that these intuitions are getting at something, call them
"principles," that transcended the conscious design of the original legislators and probably elude even
our own best interpretations, but which nevertheless sustain the law's integrality to an ever-changing
society.
In light of his commitment to realism, it should come as no surprise that Dworkin makes his point
by distinguishing the actual history of law from an idealized history that would allow us imaginative
access to the decisions that judges and legislators would have made, had they acted "on principle"
rather than on the basis of more pressing local concerns. Dworkin's moralism finally creeps in, as he
accuses of "bad faith" judges who knowingly yielded to contingency when principle would have dic-
tated a different interpretation of the law. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 225-38, 317-50.
Rather than questioning the existence of the sort of legal principles that Dworkin presupposes, his
critics would do better to tackle his moralism separately and thereby question why we should pursue
such principles, even assuming that they exist, when they conflict with more immediate demands.
CLS would seem to be the natural vantage point for launching this critique, but it too is periodically
overcome by moralism. Of course, antirealists can voice just as much moral outrage about inequities in
the law as realists can, but they cannot justify their outrage in the same way. For example, an an-
tirealist can complain about judges and legislators violating rules to which they are explicitly held
accountable by society-that is. if he is one of Singer's rationalists and not one of his nihilists or
irrationalists (see supra note 7). In the case of Singer's latter two categories, the ground becomes
much trickier, as may be readily seen by an examination of James Boyle's concept of bias in the law.
See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 685, 691-707, 746-55 (1985).
If, as Boyle and his fellow nihilists maintain, every court decision is motivated by the judge's partic-
ular social interest, then the law is "biased" in the sense that each decision "weighs" in favor of one
or another interest. This sense of bias is unproblematic for the nihilist, and is hardly enough to license
moral outrage. In fact, CLS generally endorses the appeal to local interests as a demystified way of
grounding judicial decisions. However, "bias" also suggests a weighing against-especially against
social groups that have been systematically unserved by the law. But while this fact can be easily
demonstrated, it is still not sufficient to ground an antirealist's sense of outrage. After all, since no
rules were violated in the course of making these biased judgments-indeed, there are no rules-then
our legislative options are clear: either we continue as we have or we change what we are doing, but
we do not succumb to thinking that the legal system has somehow been "betrayed" by judges acting
out of their own interest to the detriment of others. Such a thought, which abounds in CLS, comes
dangerously close to presupposing the realist's moral idealization of history and the existence of tran-
scendent principles, about which judges and legislators have definite (albeit inchoate) intuitions.
Moreover, the principles that tend to be courted are the ones most often intuited by Dwor-
kin-especially the Platonic idea of justice as the harmonizing of social interests, which at any given
moment requires that suppressed interests be compensated at the expense of dominant ones. Thus,
instead of trying to shove Dworkin into the pragmatist melting pot, CLS scholars would do better to
recognize their own backslide into Dworkin's realism.
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judgment. While Singer and Stick have much to say about such "hot"
aspects of judgment as passion and interest, they have little to say about
the "cold" aspects which systematically impede reason from reaching its
intended destination.14 As we shall see, the problem here is that the
antirealist tends to reinterpret the evidence that a realist would adduce for
the presence of cognitive limitations in ways that undercut the realist's
critical purposes. We can best start by considering the two philosophers to
whom Singer, Stick, and an increasing number of practitioners of the hu-
manities and social sciences have turned for guidance in matters philo-
sophical: Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein.15
Rorty and Bernstein claim to have diagnosed a malaise that has af-
flicted all Western philosophers since Descartes, which Bernstein has
dubbed the Cartesian Anxiety. The Cartesian Anxiety haunts one with
the belief that one's grip on reality is only as secure as one's knowledge of
it. Consequently, the philosopher puts a premium on locating indubitable
foundations for knowledge so as to maintain his contact with reality. Two
points about the Anxiety are worthy of note. First, it is much more com-
pelling as an account of my own state of knowledge than that of some
third party being observed. For while I would start to question my sanity
(and hence my grip on reality) if I seriously supposed that most of my
own beliefs were false, I would be much less inclined to question the san-
ity of people in other places and times who held mostly false beliefs. In
other words, when I look at other people, I recognize that the rationality
of their believing something is not intimately tied to whether or not those
beliefs are true.17 The second and more germane point is that the Carte-
14. The hot/cold distinction is taken from J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARx 459-510
(1985).
15. The principal sources to which they have turned are R. RORTY, supra note 12, and R. BERN-
STEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEtrMCS, AND PRAxis (1983). Al-
though Rorty and Bernstein are among the most talked about philosophers in this country today, they
have had little impact on the professional philosophy establishment. To a large extent, this should
come as no surprise, since both authors draw on and align themselves with intellectual trends of
continental European origin (especially hermeneutics and deconstruction) whose American home is to
be found in liberal arts departments outside philosophy. What is perhaps a little surprising, and very
ironic, is that so many theorists in the liberal arts departments (perhaps less so in the law) are rally-
ing behind Rorty and Bernstein as leaders of a movement which their own colleagues have been
routinely promoting for at least a generation. This point testifies to the continued image of philosophy
as the ultimate legitimating discipline-the very image that Rorty and Bernstein seek to combat!
16. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 16-20; Singer, supra note 2, at 5 n.8; Stick, supra note 2,
at 336 n.13, 336 n.15. Stick thinks that Bernstein is closer to his own position, while he takes Rorty to
be closer to Singer's.
17. This point has been used to combat the interpretive skepticism brought on by Kuhn's incom-
mensurability thesis. See supra notes 5 & 10. For example, Donald Davidson has argued that, given
an honest attempt at interpretation, our beliefs about what another person means are bound to be
largely correct, simply given the radical implausibility of our own beliefs being largely in error. D.
DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION (1984). By introducing the difference
between insider and outsider perspectives, a Davidsonian hermeneutics can be produced which allows
the ethnocentric interpreter-who has confidence that his attribution of false beliefs to others is proba-
bly correct-to return with a renewed sense of philosophical respectability. See G. MACDONALD & P.
PETTIT, SEMANTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1981). Now carried to its logical extreme, as Hilary
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sian Anxiety is clearly an affliction from which only antirealists can suf-
fer, because it involves identifying the structure of knowledge with the
structure of reality. Moreover, in good Freudian fashion, Bernstein argues
that philosophers can never really be cured of the Cartesian Anxiety;
rather, they must learn to live with it. Not surprisingly, the sorts of epi-
stemic and political practices that our two diagnosticians recommend re-
main squarely within the antirealist framework."8 Realists, by contrast,
avoid the Cartesian Anxiety entirely by learning to think of themselves as
the objects of some more advanced knower's observation."9
Putnam has proposed that we do, the ethnocentric interpreter would have to become an outsider to
himself and thereby confidently claim that most of his own beliefs are probably false. In a manner
reminiscent of Popper, Putnam has argued that this self-critical attitude is the hallmark of the scien-
tific realist mind-set! See H. PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES 18-33 (1978).
18. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 19. Consider some of the more general epistemic-political
parallels that legal theorists have picked up from Rorty and Bernstein. Start with the claim that
victims of the Cartesian Anxiety wallow in metaphysical chaos, until order has been explicitly intro-
duced by one or more rational agents laying down foundations for knowledge. R. RORTY, supra note
12, at 155-64; R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 16-20. The rescmblrnce between this seventeenth
century view of knowledge and the view of politics that Hobbes was proposing at the same time is
uncanny: An anarchic state of nature obtains until the terms of a social contract are explicitly formu-
lated. On this view, as Jeremy Bentham put it, everything is permitted that is not expressly prohib-
ited. And once the spheres of epistemic and political reason have been circumscribed by the founda-
tions and the contract, respectively, areas of "free play" are implicitly opened up. The area of
epistemic free play, or "indeterminacy," is reserved for unverifiable statements and terms whose
meanings have yet to be empirically fixed. This is the realm of metaphor, analogy, and other forms of
figurative language, which has been the main source of intellectual innovation and experimentation,
often leading to a transformation-even revolution-in the epistemic foundations themselves. Pioneer-
ing works in this still neglected area include M. HESSE, MODELS AND ANALOGIES IN SCIENCE
(1966); D. SCHON, THE DISPLACEMENT OF CONCEPTS (1963). It is to the credit of literary critic I.A.
Richards that he jumped on the verificationist bandwagon primarily because of its implications for
non-cognitive language. See I.A. RICHARDS, SPECULATIVE INSTRUMENTS (1957).
Singer places considerable weight on this constructive side of indeterminacy, whose political
equivalent is the freedom to engage in voluntary associations and other locally binding contracts, the
success or failure of which can then be used to orient the design of more globally binding legislation.
See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 97-119. This brief portrait of the Cartesian Anxiety reiterates
that liberal politics is the pursuit of antirealism by other means.
19. This antirealist interpretation of realism has been made in Clark, The Legacy of Skepticism,
69 J. PHIL. 754 (1972).
This is perhaps a good place to discuss the relation of scientific realism to the family of early
twentieth century movements known as "legal realism," which shared an interest in establishing an
ideal standpoint from which the workings of the legal system can be reliably described. A recent
review of the contemporary relevance of this movement is Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE
LJ. 613 (1987).
Despite textbook attempts to sort out the strands of legal realism, see, e.g., M. GOLDING, PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 37-39 (1975), there has been a tendency among recent theorists to treat the legal realists
as an ideologically uniform group, though there is disagreement regarding exactly which ideology they
collectively express. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 48-49; Stick, supra note 2, at 349-50. For our
purposes, it is important to discriminate between two strands. The first is represented by Oliver
Wendell Holmes' "bad man" theory of law. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
456 (1897). Holmes argued that a law is nothing more than a prediction of the punishment that a
person is most likely to receive, if he is held responsible for a given wrongdoing. This is clearly the
view of law that a lawyer has when advising a potential wrongdoer. Notice that this view, which
seems to have been the model of Harts external standpoint, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 243,
does not involve many of the features of legal realism on which contemporary theorists focus. For
example, Holmes does not challenge the transparency of legal language as a means of determining
what the law is; rather, he challenges only the view that what is determined by a law is anything
more exalted than a regularity governing judicial behavior. Thus Holmes has no need for social scien-
tists, Marxists, or anyone else who might suggest that insiders to the legal system do not possess an
The Yale Law Journal
But how does insensitivity to the realist position prevent legal theorists
from recognizing the substantial role played by cognitive limitations? At
the outset, it is important to make an obvious point about antirealists:
Namely, that they do not deny that we all commit errors and that this is
probably an ineradicable feature of our cognitive processes. However,
antirealists and realists differ substantially on what is the best explanation
of this psychological fact. Whereas the general realist strategy for explain-
ing error is in terms of our beliefs running up against an independently
existing reality, the general antirealist strategy explains error in terms of
two or more perspectives conflicting over some situation, the resolution of
which leads one perspective to be deemed "right" and the others "wrong."
The first point to make about these contrasting explanations is that
they instill different attitudes and strategies toward error. Roughly speak-
ing, realists aim for welcomed encounter with error, while antirealists aim
for avoidance and containment of error. For a realist, being in error is an
opportunity for revising one's theory to get it nore in accordance with the
nature of reality. For an antirealist, however, the very same state is seen
as indicating that one viewpoint has gained legitimacy at the expense of
some other viewpoint over a matter of common interest. Sensitive to the
heavy authoritarian overtones in this account, an antirealist like Rorty
will try then to use his explanation of "error" as the basis for arguing that
we ought to restrict the term's usage, relying as much as possible on the
mutual tolerance (if not respect) of different perspectives and revealing,
where necessary, the power plays that were required for making one per-
spective seem more acceptable than another.20
Notice also that the realist and antirealist are not merely offering con-
trasting explanations of error, but they also seem to be trying to explain
quite different features of error. Realists are concerned with understand-
ing the sort of situation that gives rise to a feeling that something has gone
optimal account of how the system works. Holmes' targets are natural law theorists and others who
think that the law is grounded in transcendent values; he seems to have no quarrel with more mun-
dane practitioners of the legal trade.
In order to get into the second debate, one must turn to other legal realists, such as Roscoe Pound,
Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and Joseph Bingham-each of whom proposes a master language
(e.g., institutional economics, sociology, behaviorism, psychoanalysis) in terms of which the legal sys-
tem can be understood much better than by means of ordinary legal language. This second strand of
legal realism is much more in the spirit of my sense of scientific realism, in that these theorists
realized that it is not sufficient, for purposes of legal reform, to say simply (as Holmes seems to) that
laws are made by humans not gods. In addition, one must endeavor to show that legal language itself
distorts the understanding that insiders have of how the system works, and hence blinds them to
various sorts of social injustices that are committed. For example, most of these legal realists believed
that the best explanation of particular judicial decisions would invoke categories (as from Marxist
class analysis) that could also be used to explain other social phenomena. In other words, in the
master language, legal activity would not appear to be governed by regularities that are relatively
autonomous from other aspects of social life. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951); Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L.
REv. 109 (1912); Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591 (1911).
20. See, e.g., R. RORTY, supra note 12, at 306-11.
[Vol. 97: 549
Scientific Realism
wrong; that is, they want to make sense of what may be called the "anom-
alousness" of error. Antirealists, on the other hand, are concerned with
understanding what people do as a result of having this feeling that some-
thing has gone wrong; that is, antirealists want to make sense of how
particular errors, or anomalies, are defined. One consequence of this dif-
ference in emphasis is that realists are often caught up short by the fact
that our confrontations with a supposedly naked reality have been re-
solved in so many different ways, each suited to the parties on hand;
hence, the focus of legal theorists on the indeterminacy of decisionmaking.
On the other hand, antirealists tend to be embarassed by an even more
basic fact, namely, that people have little control over when or where their
conflicts in perspective arise. I take this last point-antirealism's difficul-
ties in accounting for the unexpected and unintended character of er-
ror-to be decisive in favor of realism.
Admittedly, much of the mutual embarassment here is an artifact of
typically philosophical exaggeration. This is not to say, however, that the
caricature has been without influence, both among social scientists and
legal theorists.21 In any case, such a caricature makes it difficult for either
realists or antirealists to give an adequate account of our fallible nature.
The first step out of this difficulty is to recognize why mainstream social
scientists do not seem to suffer from it. Our clue lies in the relativism that
social scientists ordinarily presuppose-in the face of logical incoherence,
if philosophers were to be believed. But, as We shall then see, vindicating
relativism does not quite get us far enough to a robust treatment of our
cognitive fallibility.
21. An instructive way of characterizing the nature of this exaggeration is in terms of the degree
of reflexivity that the two sides exhibit about their own positions. In other words, to what extent does
the realist or antirealist attempt to account for her own behavior in terms of her own position? Philos-
ophers who are realists tend to be less reflexive about their positions than realists in other disciplines,
while philosophical antirealists tend to be more reflexive than their counterparts in the other disci-
plines. For their part, philosophers committed to scientific realism usually have the natural sciences in
mind and presume that the relevant sense in which reality is "independent" is with respect to all
human activity, not merely human opinion. Thus, philosophical realists tend not to apply their posi-
tions to themselves, and in fact often make a point of arguing that there is no "fact of the matter"
about concepts that are crucial for understanding the human condition. In fact, this was W.V.O.
Quine's point in proposing the "indeterminacy thesis of translation," perhaps the most widely debated
thesis in contemporary analytic philosophy of language. See P. ROTH, MEANING AND METHOD IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A CASE FOR METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 130-51 (1987).
Conversely, philosophical antirealists are all too willing to take the reflexive turn, even to the point
of rendering the past as open to human construction as is the future. Relevant in this regard is M.
OAKESHOTT, EXPERIENCE AND ITS MODES (1933). Inspired by a strict reading of the phenomenolog-
ical literature, some ethnomethodologists and legal theorists (including Singer and others who read
Roberto Unger very literally) have gone so far as to argue that reality is created anew from moment
to moment. Often these philosophical antirealists conclude that severe forms of mental illness, such as
schizophrenia, consist simply of a heightened awareness of the inherently episodic nature of reality. It
follows that attempts to "cure" mental illness are tantamount to suppressing our most natural encoun-
ter with the world. For more on this antipsychiatric orientation to the mind, see M. POLLNER, MUN-
DANE REASON (1986); CRITICAL PSYCHIATItY: THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH (D. Ingleby ed.
1980). One can certainly see the Cartesian Anxiety as the opening move down a slippery slope to this
conclusion.
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The motivation for introducing relativism into anthropology in the late
nineteenth century has been obscured by philosophers and their emulators
in the humanities and the social sciences, who have been guilty of conflat-
ing antirealism with relativism and then collapsing the two into a solipsis-
tic form of subjectivism. To illustrate these multiple conflations, take
something as basic as the Protagorean motto of relativism: "Man is the
measure of all things." Philosophers who invoke this motto nowadays take
"man" as referring to any individual thinker, when in fact it originally
referred to the average citizen of a given community, which would have
made the sophist's words quite acceptable to the likes of Aristotle.22
Indeed, relativism originated as a species of realism designed to rectify
obvious errors that were increasingly being committed by anthropologists
theoretically committed to a unilinear conception of human evolution. In
particular, too many of the practices of alien cultures were turning out to
be rationally deficient, which only enhanced the mystery of how these cul-
tures managed to survive as well as they did without feeling any need to
"develop." The nascent relativist response was to argue that the evolution-
ists had misunderstood the point of these native practices, especially the
function they served in maintaining the culture. Both sides of the ensuing
dispute took the bone of contention to be over a matter of objective fact:
Do alien practices routinely aspire, but fail, to express the norms exempli-
fied in modem Western practices? Or rather, do these practices express
some more locally appropriate norms?23 In addressing these questions,
22. The history of the usage of "relativism" is recounted in P. ROSENTHAL, WORDS AND VAL-
UES: SOME LEADING WORDS AND WHERE THEY LEAD US 115-76 (1984). An often-cited recent
philosophy article that collapses Protagorean relativism into solipsistic subjectivism is Swoyer, True
For, in RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 84-108 (M. Krausz & J. Meiland eds. 1982). Not
surprisingly, Singer does the same. See Singer, supra note 2, at 29 n.92. What Protagoras meant by
"man" (anthropos) is discussed in W. GUTHRIE A HISTORY OF GREEKc PHILOSOPHY: THE FIFTH
CENTURY ENLIGHTENMENT 188-92 (1969). Perhaps the first modern thinker to recognize that both
Protagoras and Aristotle were proposing conceptions of socially embodied reason in opposition to
Plato was Johann Georg Hamann, who played the sophist to Kant's Plato after CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON was published. See F. BEISER, THE FATE OF REASON: GERMAN PHILOSOPHY FROM KANT
TO FICHTE 16-43 (1987).
23. In the terms used above, supra note 21, mainstream practitioners of the social sciences tend to
turn the tables on reflexivity, being reflexively realist or unreflexively antirealist. In fact, a simple
example will show that these two positions really capture two aspects of a common position.
Imagine asking one of these unreflexive antirealists to define the truth. Clearly, he will refer to the
results of the most reliable verification procedures available, probably in the natural sciences. Then
ask him what happens when the procedures or their reliability change. He will readily say that the
truth changes as well. But now ask whether those scientific procedures are themselves nothing but the
results of the verification procedures that the antirealist himself uses for studying them. The antireal-
ist will undoubtedly pause before answering, since a second positive response would imply that as his
own methods for studying science change, the science under study also changes, and therefore the
truth changes. In that case, the outcome of a particle physics experiment several years back would
hang on the most recent resolution of methodological disputes in the historiography of science! Most
historians of science would want to resist this conclusion, thereby refusing to apply their antirealism
reflexively. At the same time, the historians continue to admit that the physics experiment did not
have a particular outcome, until it was constituted by the verification procedures of the local physics
community. But once that outcome had been constituted, it became a fact-on all fours with any other
natural fact-which has since had real world consequences about which historians, including the one
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much ink was spilled on the proper way of identifying the norms gov-
erning a society-and much of that ink eventually spilled into so-called
positivist theories of the law, especially through Hans Kelsen's inquiries
into the Grundnorm of a legal system and Hart's search for the ultimate
rule of recognition. 2
But, as I suggested earlier, relativism does not provide us with an ade-
quate account of human fallibility. For while relativism clearly highlights
the liabilities of the social scientist, the natives are still presumed to have
authoritative access to the norms governing their society. To fully realize
the critical potential of scientific realism, as exemplified in Marxism, the
possibility for error must extend to the natives themselves. There is a sim-
ple way of making this point, which will prepare us to delve into Singer
and Stick more deeply.
In light of the previous discussion, we might charitably interpret both
Singer and Stick as relativists of different stripes. They differ, of course,
with regard to the legitimating authority in question Singer turns to the
judge's personal deliberations, which puts him closer to the philosophical
stereotype of the relativist than Stick, who defers instead to the consent of
the community and thereby approximates the anthropologist's sense of rel-
ativism. However, neither takes seriously the possibility that the relevant
insider(s) could issue erroneous legal judgments most of the time. Three
examples of such errors, to be discussed in greater detail below, include:
(a) a judge's failure to anticipate that subsequent interpreters of his deci-
sion would attribute to him a viewpoint that he did not intend; (b) the
ability of a legislative body to agree on the wording of laws without agree-
ing on their meaning or intended range of application; (c) the inability of
both judges and legislators to calculate the net effect of their legal actions
on society, even if those actions were interpreted as intended. It is with
these three sorts of examples in mind that the legal theorist influenced by
scientific realism would attempt to deconstruct the recent talk about inde-
terminacy and community.
II. SINGER VERSUS STICK ON INDETERMINACY: A CLOSER LOOK AT
THE CROSSFIRE
Singer and Stick frame their discussion of indeterminacy in terms of the
problematic status of theory in the law. At first glance, Singer's view of
the situation seems quite simple:
under discussion, have made claims that are, in some univocally realist sense, either true or false,
regardless of whose methodology happens to be in favor. Thus, our historian is also reflexively realist.
An interesting dramatization of this issue among recent sociologists of science may be found in M.
MuLsAy, THE WORD AND THE WORLD (1985).
24. H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 97-106. The similarity between discovering the norms of an
alien culture and that of a legal system is made explicit in M. GOLDING, supra note 19.
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Legal theory is far more indeterminate and open-ended than its
adherents claim, and it expresses controversial political and moral
commitments rather than universal principles grounded in human
rationality.
Theory expresses our values; it does not create or determine them.
Theory is useful to the extent that it articulates what we value. We
"draw a line" between competing principles and then create a theory
to describe where we chose to place the line. But the theory does not
itself reconcile those values or tell us where to draw the line. It can-
not because it is something we made up to express those values and
the "line" between them. To think otherwise is to reify theory, to
remove it from human control and to pretend that it is telling us
what to do. But it cannot tell us what to do-we created it. I am not
suggesting that theory is meaningless. As I argued earlier, it can
structure our thinking in a way that limits our perception of the
available alternatives. But it is important to remember that this is
because we structured it to do this. We told ourselves what to do.25
But Stick suspects that Singer's position may involve more than meets
the eye:
More troubling, [Singer's] discussion of theory and values assumes
that values can affect theory, but that theory does not affect values.
In other words, reasons are always adopted after value choice and
never influence value choice. Singer at times seems to say that noth-
ing can be said about personal choice; theorists can point out the fact
of choice but thereafter must stand mute ...
There is an odd convergence between Singer's account of values
and that of free market theorists. Both consider the formation of val-
ues beyond rational discussion. Market theories of legislation, the
administrative process, and the common law attempt to take the dis-
cussion of values entirely out of public life. In the market, all that
matters is the fact of one's choice and not the reasons for it. I would
think both radicals and liberals would seek to reopen public life to
the full discussion of values, and not to aid in the reduction of public
discourse to claims of self-assertion.2"
One thing is clear: "Theory" has fallen on hard times in the law. Was it
so long ago that philosophers of science were celebrating the theory-laden
character of observation and Western Marxists were paying theory the
ultimate compliment of calling it a form of "revolutionary practice"?
27
But now that legal theory has decided to model itself on literary theory,
Singer has joined Stanley Fish's band of nihilists, proclaiming, "Theory
25. Singer, supra note 2, at 60.
26. Stick, supra note 2, at 391 & n.255.
27. For treatments of this question, in both philosophy of science and Marxism, see R. BHASKAR,




has no consequences!"2 Throughout his footnotes, Stick detects a sense of
deja vu in Singer's turn against theory, which is no surprise, since the last
great wave of anti-theory was logical positivism, the common foe of the
theory-laden philosophers of science and the Western Marxists. 9 And as
with the last wave, the one on which Singer rides pastes over trenchant
ambiguities with punchy slogans. After all, what exactly does it mean for
theory to have no consequences? Here are three rather different answers:
(a) Theory cannot, by definition, have any consequences.
(b) Theory does not, in actual fact, have any consequences.
(c) Theory ought not, as a matter of principle, have any consequences.
Stick seems to realize that Singer is on progressively shakier ground, as
he slides from (a) to (b) to (c). At least, Stick sees that (a) is the most
persuasive reading of Fish's slogan, namely, as the thesis that formulating
a theory and specifying its proper application are logically distinct activi-
ties.30 Even if persuasive, (a) is hardly cause for alarm, since it is just an
abstract way of explaining the division of legal labor between legislators
and judges: Laws can't be drafted in anticipation of all future cases, and
cases don't come packaged with instructions for legal subsumption. Admit-
tedly, analytic philosophers, especially followers of the later Wittgenstein,
28. Fish makes his case in Fish, Consequences, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND
THE NEW PRAGMATISM 106-31 (W. Mitchell ed. 1985); see also Fish, Dennis Martinez and the
Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
In Dennis Martinez, supra, Fish argues that being able to articulate what one is supposed to do in
a baseball game (here, that Dennis Martinez, a pitcher, should throw strikes) is neither sufficient nor
necessary to complete the task. One must also have an intuitive understanding of what to do when
playing the game, and having that intuitive understanding makes it unnecessary for one to have an
articulated theory of how to play the game. The theory of baseball, in other words, is irrelevant to the
practice of baseball.
Fish diverges from Singer in that he directly addresses the question of how we are to make deci-
sions if we arc not to rely on theory. He argues that we make our decisions on the basis of an
"enriched notion of practice," which lets us intuitively pick out those aspects of a situation which we
regard as most important. (For a comparable view cast in terms of how judges make decisions, see
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
518 (1986).) In essence, Fish uses practice as a substitute for what theorists have traditionally meant
theory to do-highlight some aspects of situations as important, others as irrelevant; select options;
frame alternatives; provide the means for evaluating the desirability of the results of our decisions. It
seems that he must answer all the questions that he posed to those who argue for the primacy of
theory.
Fish, however, tries to deflect attention from this fact. He does this by misconstruing what it means
to follow a theory. For instance, he says that a pitcher in a baseball game who did not try to throw
strikes would not be recognized as playing the game at all. This conflates what it means to play the
game seriously and competently with what it means to be doing something that is recognizable as
playing the game at all. The former situation is governed by regulative rules, the latter by constitutive
rules. Fish's effort-which largely repeats John Rawls' original effort (baseball example and all) in
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955)-is nonetheless an improvement on Singer's
work, which ignores this question.
29. Logical positivism was "anti-theory" in holding that a scientific theory was "cognitively sig-
nificant" solely in virtue of-and hence was reducible to-its logical structure and its observable
consequences. See LOGICAL PosrIvsM (A. Ayer ed. 1959).
30. See Stick, supra note 2, at 361-67. (A) is the most persuasive reading of Fish's slogan, insofar
as his paradigm case of a "theory" is Chomsky's generative grammar, which Fish faults for being
insensitive to the context-bound nature of linguistic usage. See Fish, Consequences, supra note 28, at
108-11.
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have made much of (a)'s implications for language's grip on the world, to
wit, that it is "indeterminate.""1
However, our interlocutors seem to be of two minds about the source of
indeterminacy in the legal system. 2 On the one hand, there is the sort
that arises from the judge (or legal community) being unable to specify all
the premises which together determine that a case be decided in a certain
way. This is the sense of indeterminacy which is sometimes characterized
as the "tacit dimension" of legal reasoning.33 On the other hand, indeter-
minacy may arise from the judge (or legal community) being unable to
give any principled reasons why a particular case ought to be subsumed
under one rule rather than another. This is the sort of indeterminacy that
gives legal rules their supposed "open texture," which makes them usable
in cases that had not been anticipated by the original legislators, and per-
haps even contrary to the legislators' intentions. 4 I suspect that these two
senses of indeterminacy are confused because they are both ultimately
grounded in our general inability to monitor and control language use in
society at large, a fact that is most easily recognized from a realist
perspective.
35
31. The post-positivist concern with indeterminacy is epitomized in L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1958). To see the hidden influence of this concern in the philosophy of
law, consider the cases of Hans Kelsen (who attended the meetings of the Vienna Circle) and Herbert
Hart (who was a student of Wittgenstein).
32. A curious feature of the Singer-Stick debate is that our two interlocutors treat indeterminacy
as a univocal phenomenon with several "sources" rather than as a collection of rather disparate (at
least two distinct types of) phenomena. See Stick, supra note 2, at 352-69.
33. The expression "tacit dimension" originates with M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
(1957), which argues that most of what scientists learn in their training involves an inarticulate sense
of "know-how" similar to that required to gain mastery of a craft. It is an intrinsically practical, not
theoretical (or propositional) form of reasoning. Nevertheless, this has not stopped artificial intelli-
gence researchers from trying to model scientific reasoning "algorithmically," i.e., as a set of rules
sufficient for determining some outcome. The same applies to legal reasoning. An especially good
example is A. GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL REASONING 33-66
(1987). Gardner argues that legal reasoning seems indeterminate only because legal rules are alone
insufficient for determining legal decisions. In addition, there are extra-legal value premises, which
vary from judge to judge, and hence make legal decisionmaking seem indeterminate. However, for
each decision, Gardner believes that one could supply the missing value premises. A general critique
of this sort of attempt to minimize the import of the tacit dimension is H. DREYFUS & S. DREYFUS,
MIND OVER MACHINE (1986).
34. The expression "open texture," while associated with Wittgenstein's later writings on the
learning and extension of concepts, was in fact coined by one of the original Vienna Circle positivists,
Friedrich Waismann. See Waismann, Verifiability, in LANGUAGE AND LOGIC (A. Flew ed. 1951).
35. The antirealist impulse is revealed in the tendency (by no means confined to Singer and Stick)
to presume that the tacit dimension is indeterminate. Yet, what is neither said by nor readily accessi-
ble to a reasoner may still have a status just as determinate as those, features of his reasoning to which
the reasoner has ready access. At least the realist can make this claim, since for her the only difference
between the articulated and the silent is that the former is perceived and the latter is not. But only the
antirealist ties reality to perceivability and accessibility. Thus, even if H. DREYFUS & S. DREYFUS,
supra note 33, is correct in maintaining that fully articulating the tacit dimension would require
infinitely many propositions, those could be infinitely many determinate propositions, whose trenchant
inarticulateness would rest merely on the fact that we are not able to articulate indefinitely: again, a
case of cognitive fallibility.
As for the "open texture" sense of indeterminacy, its trenchant character may be seen in the re-
peated failures of grammarians and other linguistic purists to fix the meanings of words. Wittgenstein
has since taught us to rationalize the inevitability of semantic drift by celebrating the flexibility of
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Even more typical of the recent debates in legal theory is the tendency
for interlocutors to misfire between the (b) and (c) senses of "theory has
no consequences." In particular, Singer asserts (c) and Stick then spends
most of his ammunition denying (b). Singer's proposed escape from mere
nihilism is an "expressivist" theory of law, which starts from the Rous-
seavian premise that theory's burdens should weigh more lightly on our
minds once we realize that they are self-imposed."6 Such assurances offer
small comfort, however, unless Singer specifies whether he would have
legal theorists merely reinterpret what they normally do (i.e., as an
"expressive" rather than a "mechanical" process), or whether he would
actually have theorists liberate their reasoning in some yet-to-be-disclosed
manner. Stick is bewildered by all this, but he seems to think that Singer's
musings on how legal theorists ought to think (about how they think) can
be answered by showing that legal theorizing has in fact issued in a con-
vergent set of political options, which have been most clearly articulated
by contemporary liberalism."7
The problem with Stick trying to answer Singer in this fashion is that
even if he were to succeed in demonstrating that American legal theory
has tended toward liberal political consequences, Stick would still be faced
with the task of demonstrating that legal theory as such-and not merely
something contingently associated with it (such as the class backgrounds of
key theorists)-has actually been responsible for the liberal consequences.
Pending this second demonstration, Singer, in fine OLS form, can con-
tinue to explain away Stick's appeal to a concrete liberal consensus as
simply indicating that many different interests have been able to travel
under the mantle of liberalism. Indeed, in Singer's hands, this would be
an argument for condemning talk of "liberal consensus" as a deceptive
ideological practice.
So far, it looks as though Singer and Stick have been shooting past each
other. But this is not to say that they have not missed some key targets as
well. In particular, they miss two targets, which, if confronted squarely,
would force them to recognize the sense of cognitive limitations that is
most apparent from a realist standpoint.
To get the first target into view, consider that while our two interlocu-
tors have much to say about whether there is a rational pattern in the
application of legal theory to specific cases, neither says much about
whether there is a rational pattern in the specific cases which give rise to
the application of legal theory. It is one thing to argue that judges decide
linguistic rules in capturing new situations. Indeed, the ease with which we nowadays accept Wittgen-
stein's story moves us dangerously close to the belief that language was designed to be ever-creative
and ever-adaptable. That this is little more than a "just-so" story becomes dear upon recalling that
our limited capacity to monitor and coordinate the utterances of dispersed speakers leaves us no choice
but to make do with language perpetually adrift.
36. Singer, supra note 2, at 59-70.
37. Stick, supra note 2, at 383-401.
1988]
The Yale Law Journal
cases in a rational fashion, but quite another to argue that the cases them-
selves arise in a fashion conducive to rational decisionmaking. For exam-
ple, even if we granted Stick's point that, under the circumstances of a
given case, a judge generally makes the most rational decision he can, an
enemy of judicial rationality could always respond that the legal system
has so little control over the "circumstances" in which cases
arise-perhaps because they depend so heavily on changes in the political
climate-that a judge is repeatedly forced to trade off high-minded princi-
ples of rationality against short term political expedients. This, in turn,
serves to attenuate Stick's concept of judicial rationality beyond all recog-
nition-but hardly in a way that Singer could approve. After all, the judi-
cial irrationalist's argument plays, not to the expressive strength, but to
the cognitive weakness of the judge." Singer's image of theorizing as
"drawing a line" is useful here. For while we may decide where to draw
the line between competing principles, we do not decide when such a line
needs to be drawn, which suggests that we also have little control over
whether the line is likely to stay exactly where we draw it.
The second target can also be seen by paying close attention to Singer's
text, especially to his equivocal use of the first-person plural. The reader
immediately knows that something has gone awry when a community is
able to take comfort in the sort of solipsism implied by "We told ourselves
what to do." Singer seems to be appealing to a bogus social epistemology,
whereby all members of the community move as one mind, hence permit-
ting an easy equation of "we" and "ourselves." Stick picks up on some of
this in his bafflement over Singer's propensity to treat collective decision-
making as simply individual decisionmaking writ large: "we" as a genera-
lized "me."
Ultimately, I suspect that Singer is given to this absurd rhetoric because
he confuses two senses of "membership." On the one hand, I may be a
"member" of a group by being one of a set of people with similar attrib-
utes; on the other hand, I may be a "member" by having attributes com-
plementary to the ones had by the people with whom I constitute the
38. The judicial irrationalist in the example is actually espousing a form of "bounded rational-
ity," which is the only sort of rationality possible, given severe cognitive constraints. This point was
first made in the late 1940s when Herbert Simon criticized the utility-maximizer model as being too
idealized a picture of real agents to be of much use in predicting the complicated patterns of economic
behavior found in modern society. For an excellent review of research in this area, see March,
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142 (J. El-
ster ed. 1986). Since 1960, Simon has helped steer artificial intelligence research away from develop-
ing "the perfect computer" to modeling the imperfect computations of cost-and-corner-cutting reason-
ers like ourselves. See H. SIMON, THE ScsF.cNcas OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981).
Simon has a distinctive slant on our cognitive liabilities; for example, he would argue that humans
are very fallible because they cannot reproduce by their own means (i.e., either "in the head" or "on
paper") the complexity that exists outside their means. Social constructions thus come to take a life of




group (e.g., a quarterback on a football team). '39 Since Singer basically
treats the second sense as little more than the first, he fails to see that,
even granting consistent enforcement of the law, any piece of legislation or
adjudication will have a wide range of effects on the members of society,
relative to their social position, most of which cannot be anticipated and
would not have been intended.' ° For example, affirmative action legisla-
tion may serve to catalyze a heretofore docile segment of the white middle
class to rethink their notions of social justice, leading to the ouster of the
original legislators. To return, once again, to Singer's image, members of
the society who were motivated to draw a line between competing princi-
ples do not necessarily turn out to to be the ones who benefit from the line
having been drawn.
III. REALISM AND THE RESOLUTION OF INDETERMINACY
As we uncover the muddles in which Singer and Stick are mired, the
reader should ask whether the "indeterminacy" is supposed to lie in the
essential incompleteness of language (or law) itself as a representation of
the world or merely in our own uncertainty about how the representa-
tional process works. The antirealist characteristically holds reality
accountable for failures that the realist would blame only on our limited
cognitive grasp.
A good place to begin our inquiry is with the quote from CLS historian
Robert Gordon on which Singer bases his discussion of indeterminacy:
[By "indeterminacy," the OLS scholars] don't mean-although
sometimes they sound as if they do-that there are never any pre-
dictable causal relations between legal forms and anything else ...
[T]here are plenty of short- and medium-run stable regularities in
social life, including regularities in the interpretation and applica-
tion, in given contexts, of legal rules. Lawyers, in fact, are constantly
making predictions for their clients on the basis of these regularities.
The Critical claim of indeterminacy is simply that none of these reg-
ularities are necessary consequences of the adoption of a given
regime of rules. The rule-system could also have generated a differ-
ent set of stabilizing conventions leading to exactly the opposite re-
39. The distinction in membership that Singer fails to see is one that late nineteenth century
sociologists commonly used to differentiate societies before and after the division of labor had set in.
Before members of a society acquired specialized tasks, they were joined together by "mechanical
solidarity," which is to say, by their similarity or functional interchangeability. Once specialization
had emerged, the social bond was constructed out of "organic solidarity," which implied that the
members were functionally interdependent. A famous account of this transition is E. DURKHEIM, THE
DIvISIoN OF LABOR IN SociETY (1957).
40. For this reason, Friedrich von Hayek and other "classical liberals" have argued that consis-
tent enforcement is the only sense of justice that the law can administer without intruding on personal
freedom. Moreover, the fact that the law affects different social groups differently has the added
benefit of continually renovating how those groups relate to each other. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
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sults and may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds, switch
to those opposing conventions at any time.'
Gordon's quotation is interesting because, for all its apparent lucidity, it
continues to leave in doubt the exact role that legal rules play, or could
play, in determining the outcomes of particular cases. Can lawyers relia-
bly use legal rules, in conjunction with other socio-political indicators, to
determine the outcome of a case before the judge actually makes his deci-
sion? Or is it rather that lawyers can reliably determine the legal rules to
which the judge will appeal in justifying his decision, once he has already
decided the outcome of the case? The potential indeterminacy of legal
rules implied in these two questions is quite different. In the first ques-
tion, legal rules are "indeterminate" in the sense of telling an incomplete
story of how the judicial decisionmaking process works, since socio-
political matters also enter into a judge's reasoning. In the second ques-
tion, however, the "indeterminacy" of legal rules stems from their playing
no real causal role in the judge's reasoning, since the rules serve merely to
rationalize the decision, after the fact, in a legally acceptable manner.
The distinction between these two senses of indeterminacy is most
apparent to someone viewing the legal system from the outside because
the outsider would have a clear sense of the conceptual difference between
what best explains a judge's decision and her own way of accounting for
it. While the judge's conscious deliberations may reflect the true move-
ment of her reasoning, there is no a priori reason to think that it does.
Instead, a better account may require appealing to categories-perhaps
Marxist or psychoanalytic ones-cognitively unavailable to the judge and,
in any case, irrelevant to her duties (in the same way that complex lin-
guistic rules are unavailable to the average speaker). After all, the judge's
authority rests not on her own impeccable powers of self-knowledge, but
on the network of legal relations in which she plays a major role.42 Now
41. Gordon, supra note 6, at 125, quoted in Singer, supra note 2, at 20 n.55.
42. Experimental psychologists have repeatedly shown that "expert judgment" is often not much
better than the judgments of lay people, and that when the experts get things right it is not because
they have systematically applied their professional training. As a result of these findings, a consensus
is emerging that expert reasoning is more "intuitive" than "analytical," a suspicious distinction which
on close inspection simply reifies the fact that experts reason in a manner sufficiently irregular to
elude everyone's understanding. What this means, of course, is that most faulty judgments probably go
undetected in the normal course of things. This tale of cognitive woe is told for virtually every area of
expertise (including the law) in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (H. Arkes & K. Hammond eds.
1986).
These liabilities may eventually cancel each other out and do some unintended good, but at the very
least they cause an imperceptible drift in the grip that our social constructions have on the world,
hence giving them a life of their own. For a try at giving these dismal findings a Panglossian twist see
Stich, Could Man Be an Irrational Animal?, in NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY 249-67 (H. Korn-
blith ed. 1985). Based on the experiments, Stich must answer yes, but he then speculates that this is
because "rationality" is really not a single cognitive competence, but rather diverse skills which re-
quire explicit training in specific fields. Since we cannot reasonably be expected to master every field,
we normally must defer to the cognitive authority of others, which in turn fosters a cooperative spirit.
Stich's tale would be more convincing if experts performed somewhat better on these experiments than
[Vol. 97: 549
Scientific Realism
contrast this position with Singer's, which discusses judicial decisionmak-
ing as if he himself were the judge:
The same theories could be used to justify very different sorts of
institutions and very different rules. This does not mean, however,
that outcomes in our legal system are completely unpredictable or
that the choices made by judges are arbitrary in the sense that they
are unconsidered. Considered choices can be described and even pre-
dicted to some extent because they are conditioned by legal culture,
conventions, "common sense," and politics. Custom, rather than rea-
son, narrows the choices and suggests the result.'
The expression that gives away Singer's confusion of Gordon's position
is "considered choices." Singer supposes that no matter how incomplete a
picture of judicial decisionmaking legal rules may give, they must play
some causal role in the final outcome because those rules figure in the
judge's explicit "considerations." Since Singer presumes that the judge is
an epistemic authority on her own reasoning process, he cannot entertain
the second sense of "indeterminacy" that was culled from Gordon. Conse-
quently, he is unable to deal with, for example, the Marxist hypothe-
sis-treated by Gordon himself (to his credit)-that legal rules are mere
ideological epiphenomena, ways in which agents in the social system
deceive themselves and others about how the system works.
Stick hardly helps matters here, since he explicitly denies that the legal
system could ever be engulfed in false consciousness, where all reasons
turn out to be nothing but rationalizations. Like Singer, he takes the only
legitimate standpoint from which to evaluate the law to be the "inside,"
his only difference being that he would make the judge accountable, not
merely to her own conscience, but also "to what practicing lawyers them-
selves say about the standards of rationality."
4 4
Stick is confident that error will continue to be-as it has been in the
past-corrected before reaching the systemic proportions feared by Marx-
ists. However, it is by no means clear that Stick has a firm grasp on the
sort of Marxist ideology critique which Gordon and the more systematic
members of CLS periodically practice-especially in light of his reliance
on the following sort of argument: "But a belief that all of our standards
of rational argument are mere rationalizations is self-refuting and unintel-
ligible on its own terms."'45 Stick himself undermines this argument in the
they in fact do. Another, and somewhat more acceptable, reading of the psychological data is provided
in D. FAUST, THE LIMITS OF ScIENTiFic REASONING (1985). Faust argues that our trenchant cogni-
tive liabilities point toward a scientific ethic of mutual criticism along the lines suggested by Karl
Popper.
43. Singer, supra note 2, at 24-25.
44. Stick, supra note 2, at 353; cf Holmes, supra note 19.
45. Stick, supra note 2, at 358 n.108. The argument is taken from H. PUTNAM, REASON,
TRUTH, AND HISTORY 155-63 (1981).
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last four words, since only someone attempting a total critique from
within the legal system would be rendered unintelligible. For in that case,
the critic would be in the paradoxical position of using the system's own
terms to convey their systematically misleading character. But, of course,
the Marxist's analytic categories are not those of the law; rather, they
constitute a "metalanguage" in terms of which the distortions of legal rea-
soning can be coherently and systematically uncovered. At this point, we
would do well to examine Gordon's work more closely to see how the
potential for total critique of the law can be realized-even if Gordon
himself falls somewhat short.
Gordon's basic strategy is to deconstruct the "lawlike' qualities of the
Marxism has generally not fared well in the recent legal theory debates, either in the hands of a
liberal like Stick or a CLS partisan such as James Boyle (see supra note 13, at 721-36). Not surpris-
ingly, both read the Marxist as an antirealist for whom scientific progress would entail reducing legal
categories to socio-political ones, especially categories identifying the dominant class interests in a
society. On such a view, legal terms do refer to regularly occurring social events, ones whose regular-
ity is controlled by these interests. This antirealist misreading of Marxism, to which Boyle succumbs,
better fits certain vulgar forms of legal realism. The British legal theorist Hugh Collins has dubbed
the misreading "the fetishism of law." See H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1984). Unfortunately,
as Collins notes in painful detail, Marx's avowed followers have been among the main fetishists.
What this fetishism misses is Marx's own characteristic realism, which stresses our inability to pre-
vent social constructions from attaining lives of their own. Indeed, this is the most important sense
(Hegel's originally) in which alienation occurs at the societal level. Thus, the law is neither part of
the social order's causal infrastructure nor the mere instrument of the dominant class, which are the
only two options available on the antirealist misreading. Rather, the Marxist realist regards the law
as an alienated and false self-understanding of a society's workings, to which all classes appeal-at
least prior to their Marxist awakening-in order to legitimate their activities. In short, law is the
ideology that is common to all interests in a society. For more on Marxist realism, see R. BHAsKAR,
supra note 27; A. CALLINICOS, supra note 27.
Roberto Unger's reading of the failure of Marxism has colored what even CLS theorists have taken
to be Marx's significance. See supra note 4; see also infra note 52. Unger applauds Marx, especially
Marx's early writings, for being sensitive to the contexts in which alienation is personally experienced
and the extent to which those contexts are the product of people imposing their wills on others who
often simply do not resist because they take their fate to be much more determined than it really is.
These are the sources of Marx's radical message. Marx went wrong, according to Unger, when he
turned his attention from particular contexts to large scale structures, which more easily promote the
illusion of social stability and indeed led his "orthodox" followers to recommend political quiescence
until the relevant structures had reached an appropriate point in their development. Thus, whereas
Marxists have tended to think that a comprehensive social science was the key to setting the agenda
for revolutionary practice, Unger argues that this has in fact had an inhibitory effect. The key, rather,
lies in seeing the large scale social structures as illusory surfaces for the supposedly real indeterminacy
of human action that occurs at the local level in the course of reproducing these structures. Unger's
attitudes toward Marx come out clearest in R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 96-130,
230-35.
Unger's view of Marx is very much in evidence in Singer's misreading of the famous opening of the
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon:
"[People] make their own history," Marx tells us, "but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past." We should be comfortable viewing both
rationality and social life as historically and culturally situated. Viewing legal theory in this
way will allow us to exorcise the wrongful expectation that some politically neutral, ahistorical
method can generate answers to questions about what the legal rules should be.
Singer, supra note 2, at 63. Singer makes it seem as though Marx's point is that the rationality
embodied in social history is limited to the interests and issues recognized by decisionmakers at the
moment, when in fact Marx is making the quite opposite Hegelian (and realist) point that people are
the unwitting instruments of history, the recipients of the unintended and unanticipated conzequences
of past decisions.
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law by descending into ever finer levels of microstructural analysis. Thus,
from the easily falsified idea that the law governs all uniformly, he pro-
ceeds to show that the law does not have uniform responses to specific
social needs, nor does it even weigh for or against particular interest
groups on a regular basis. The most curious feature of this interesting
approach is that it leaves Gordon fairly optimistic about the feasibility of
individual empowerment along the lines associated with Roberto Unger."'
Gordon's optimism, however, seems to rest on two interconnected but con-
troversial assumptions.
First, Gordon assumes that if the legal deconstructionist has traversed
the various levels of social structure in which the law operates, only to
find indeterminacy at each level, then he has reached the end of his in-
quiry. Second, Gordon assumes that awareness of this fact should
encourage disadvantaged individuals and interest groups to stake their
claims ever more vigorously, since their voices could indeed make a differ-
ence in the outcomes of particular cases. The problem with Gordon's
making these two assumptions is that they reflect an antirealist bias,
whereby the inquirer's inability to transcend a certain stage in his analysis
is taken as evidence of the indeterminate or diverse character of the object
of inquiry. However, at the level of total critique, where Stick would dare
not venture, a systematic account of legal phenomena may be possible,
though it may also involve showing that the law is much more continuous
with the rest of society than legal language would itself suggest. Neverthe-
less, such a conclusion would not be inhospitable to the outsider perspec-
tive of the realist.
47
46. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 52-56 (1986). A good case study is
Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987).
47. Here is a sketch of such a realist argument, consonant with Gordon's work and modeled on
similar arguments made by realists in other branches of science:
(1) Taken on its own terms, the law constitutes a more or less coherent system of propositions,
including generalizations about, e.g., the defeasibility conditions for applying legal concepts (Hart)
and the sanctions that judges are obliged to apply when a law has been broken (Kelsen).
(2) However, legal entities such as "contract," "volition," and even "the rule of law" itself cannot
be related to non-legal entities (e.g. types of social action) on a regular basis. Thus, depending on the
context, the same law may be enforced under a variety of mutually incompatible social conditions.
(3) It may be tempting-if only to encourage people that political action can make a difference to
what courts and legislatures decide-to conclude that the law is relatively autonomous from the rest of
society and that, as a result, its workings cannot be fully determined by any set of socio-political
regularities. Nevertheless, this observed indeterminacy may simply be the result of legal categories
failing to refer to any regularly occurring events in society, the implication being that legal terms do
not pick out any entities that play a causal role in the 'social order.
(4) This conclusion may seem less radical if we recall that the law (i.e., legal discourse) serves
primarily a justificatory role, and only secondarily an explanatory one. In other words, legal general-
izations normally occur in accounts of actions already committed (e.g., during a trial), where the point
is to make sense of the particular case under study rather than to predict the appearance of subse-
quent cases of that kind.
(5) Finally, let us be clear as to what exactly has been "eliminated." No one is denying the occur-
rence of particular events in which laws and legal concepts are said to be "enforced," "broken,"
"enacted," "repealed," and so forth. Rather, what is being denied is that the existence of "laws" or
their occult "enforcement" would need to be posited in explaining those episodes, and hence in relia-
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IV. UNRESOLVED INDETERMINACY: FREEDOM AS IGNORANCE IN
DISGUISE
As the source of many of the leading ideas in the Singer-Stick debate,
Roberto Unger is responsible for characterizing indeterminacy as some-
thing that can be made to work in our favor "if we want," to use one of
Singer's favorite phrases. Unger takes the indeterminacy of legal rules as
occasions for "self-empowerment," or asserting one's "destabilization
rights."4 Let us consider these ideas more closely. Unger argues that
while the law tends to be applied in a manner that is systematically biased
against certain classes, we need to keep in mind that these biases are ulti-
mately nothing more than the aggregation of particular cases being
resolved in particular ways. Consequently, each new case is an opportu-
nity for either reproducing or destabilizing the bias. What Unger does not
seem to notice is that the legal system is sufficiently independent of the
wills of particular individuals-indeterminacy and all-that if a concerted
and systematic effort is not made to destabilize the regnant biases on a
bly predicting similar subsequent episodes. This point is analogous to the one made by sociologists of
religion, who do not normally deny the experience that the theist characterizes as a "belief in God,"
but only that theological categories figure in the best explanation of the theist's experience.
This argument is modeled on the steps by which certain hard-line realists in cognitive science
eliminate the need to postulate the existence of such folk psychological entities as beliefs and desires in
order to explain what they take to be purely neurobehavioral phenomena. For the arguments leading
to these radical conclusions, see P. CHURCHLAND, SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND THE PLASTICITY OF
MIND (1979). The debate on this topic is recounted in S. STICH, FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO
COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1983).
The reader should see the arguments in light of the remarks I made earlier about the second strand
of legal realism (supra note 19), the ways in which a realist could reinterpret the apparent indetermi-
nacy of concepts and terms (supra note 35), and the general scientific realist premise that scientific
language (e.g., the Marxist's metalanguage or the standpoint of the outsiders) is significantly different
from ordinary language in making an explicit effort to capture the ultimate regularities of nature, and
not simply to make sense of an event in terms of a standing piece of common sense. Of course,
antirealists have failed to see any such difference and have even tried to give Wittgensteinian accounts
of scientific language. See, e.g., B. BARNES, T.S. KUHN AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1982).
48. R. UNGER, supra note 46. Unger's prognosis is overly optimistic if it rests, as it seems to rest,
on the assumption that people have more control of their situation when they are able to act on behalf
of concrete self-expression than when they are forced to act in conformity with abstract expressions of
legislative will. At first, the assumption appears quite reasonable, if only because we presumably have
more intimate knowledge of ourselves than of the law, the construction of which we have given at
most tacit consent to. Yet, here too, the experiments tell a tale of cognitive woe, for the self-
interestedness of one's reasoning is no guarantee that it will be especially well monitored or informed.
Again, this is not to deny that people will try to maximize their own interests and perhaps even be
more strongly driven toward that end than toward conformity with the law. All I deny is the likeli-
hood of their success. On the inability of subjects to act consistently to satisfy their own self-defined
interests (as expressed by incompetence at formulating expected utilities), see Tversky & Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 38, at
123-41. Regarding our self-predictive and self-explanatory liabilities, see R. NIsBETr & L. Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1983).
To dispel the thought that the law's indeterminacy makes it a willing instrument of special interests
and systematic biases, the antirealist should conduct a long-term historical study which clearly sepa-
rates the interests that motivated a particular piece of legislation or judicial decision from the interests
that subsequently benefited from that legal action. If the law is anything like science, there will be
remarkably little overlap in the two sets of interests. Indeed, given the likely shifts in the balance of
power over time, it would not be surprising to see the motivators not benefiting, and perhaps even
suffering, from their original actions.
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mass level, then the few isolated pockets of successful self-empowerment
will appear as minor statistical aberrations. Here too we see a mis-
matching of perspectives, an attempt to treat from an insider's perspective
a problem that is ideally seen from the outside (i.e., the reality of the legal
system independent of one's own case). This aspect of Unger's thinking
comes out most clearly in its influence on Singer's brief discussion of
empowerment:
How then do we make value choices? The desperation with which
people ask this question rests on the assumption that legal rules
obtain whatever legitimacy they have by being chosen in a way that
is essentially different. By now it should be clear that I do not think
that there is a difference. And this revelation should not be exper-
ienced as leaving us helpless; rather, it should be experienced as em-
powering us.49
In what follows this passage, Singer continues hi!, upbeat message, ob-
serving, among other things, that our competence in making value choices
is evidenced by the fact that we can live with those choices, and that our
freedom to choose as we do is reflected in our ability to imagine alterna-
tive ways of weighting the relevant considerations, which would have led
to the application of different legal rules. The inferential links suggested
here between, on the one hand, competence and survival, and, on the
other, freedom and contingency, are among the most epistemically falla-
cious and politically naive consequences to be drawn from focusing exclu-
sively on the insider perspective.
Singer's alleged connection between freedom and contingency is quickly
disposed of. My awareness of alternative possibilities may indeed establish
that the world could have been other than it is, but my awareness says
nothing about whether it was within my power to bring about one of
those alternatives. For example, I can imagine a world in which I voted
for Reagan in 1980 and for Lincoln in 1860, but clearly only the former
was within my power to bring about."
49. Singer, supra note 2, at 62.
50. This point is made in J. SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS, AND SCIENCE 98 (1984).
In addition, it has become common for European social theorists (e.g., Anthony Giddens and Pierre
Bourdieu) to observe that from a pre-theoretical, phenomenological standpoint, freedom and con-
straintfeel exactly the same. What makes the difference is the background knowledge that the agent
has. See J. THOMPSON, STUDIEs IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOcY 42-72, 148-72 (1984).
If this point seems counterintuitive, consider that the exercise of either freedom or constraint re-
quires that one's experience be much more structured than the concept of indeterminacy would sug-
gest. After all, indeterminacy implies that the world is indifferent to all possibilities, so that only
chance makes the difference as to which one is actualized. Both freedom and constraint involve nar-
rowing the possibilities down to a set of "options," the relative preference and feasibility of which can
be ordered by the agent. Moreover, it is important that this set befinite, otherwise the problem will
escape the agent's cognitive powers, which will either immobilize him entirely or force him preemp-
tively to cut down what decision theorists call "the possibility space." If the preferred options are
feasible, then the agent is relatively free; if not, then he is relatively constrained. Moreover, the level
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Singer's other fallacious inference, from survival to competence, is
short-circuited by noting that, given our trenchant cognitive limitations,
whatever permits us to survive from one decision to the next musWf- rk
by compensating for those limitations. After all, were we not acquainted
with the experimental and historical evidence of our cognitive liabilities,
we would be like Singer and hardly notice them. Consequently, strategies
must have also evolved for converting our debits into assets. Two of these
strategies, sour grapes and precommitment, have been studied in some
detail by the Norwegian political scientist Jon Elster.5 1 The name "sour
grapes" alludes to the fable by La Fontaine, in which a fox learns to live
with its inability to reach the grapes at the top of a tree by persuading
itself that the grapes were probably sour anyway. As we can see from this
example alone, the strategy works to show that a seemingly suboptimal
state of the world is not really so bad-and that any other possible world
would probably be worse anyway. While sour .grapes is clearly a species
of rationalization, it should not be assumed that a belief influenced by
sour grapes is necessarily false, for the grapes may well be sour. At the
same time, though, the fox's hypothesis is clearly unfalsifiable, since it
was uttered with the express purpose of not being tested. In other words,
a presupposition of sour grapes is that the agent is sufficiently satisfied
with the current state of the world so as not to have an interest in explor-
ing the alternative that is debunked by his hypothesis.
Since sour grapes itself involves a warped understanding of our failures
of mind, we may suitably dub it a metaliability. As such, it gives us half
the story of the ease with which we turn a blind eye to our cognitive
limitations: In particular, it tells how we turn a blind retrospective eye.
Precommitment is the strategy by which we turn a blind prospective eye.
of feasibility can be manipulated by adding or subtracting from the agent's knowledge of the objective
conditions of his world.
Decision theorists have coined the expression "Buridan's Ass" to describe a situation in which an
agent is immobilized because he prefers all the available options equally and thus cannot decide be-
tween them. The agent may value them all equally because he does not have the information needed
to distinguish between them or because there is no objective difference between them. The expression
comes from an example used by the medieval scholastic, Jean Buridan, in which an ass starves to
death because it cannot decide which of two identical piles of hay it should eat. As for the problem of
honing down an infinitude of options without actually evaluating them, Daniel Dennett has discussed
this matter in cognitive-scientific terms as the "frame problem." Dennett, Cognitive Wheels: The
Frame Problem in AI, in MINDS, MACHINES, AND EVOLUTION 129-52 (C. Hookway ed. 1984).
51. J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983) (studying sour grapes); J. EsTER, ULYSSES AND THE Si-
RENS (1979) (studying precommitment). The cognitive limits exposed by sour grapes and precommit-
ment undermine the psychological viability of utilitarianism as a theory of social choice. Specifically, it
shows that the desirability of some state of affairs is intrinsically bound up with the perceived
probability of its occurrence. This connection serves to call into question the concept of "expected
value" found in decision theory, on which quantitative versions of utilitarianism rely, since that con-
cept presupposes that you can measure the extent to which you expect something to happen indepen-
dently of the extent to which you want it to happen. From an historical perspective, this predisposi-
tion to react positively to whatever happens may be explained as an instance of sour grapes. For more
on the "subversion of rationality," especially regarding incrementalist reasoning, see R. GOODIN, PO-
LITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 19-38 (1982).
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This is the metaliability that lets us think that we act more often to bene-
fit our interests than we really do. The most notorious cases work by a
"self-fulfilling prophecy." Specifically, our desire for some end "precom-
mits" us to interpreting all subsequent events-however unpalatable they
may seem in their own right-as positively contributing to that end. A
vivid example is the extent to which the early economic hardships of the
Soviet Union were ideologically converted into tests of fortitude for the
Russian people, specifically into tests of their willingness to relinquish
fully their pre-socialist ways. Like sour grapes, the net effect of this strat-
egy is to make us settle for less when more was originally intended, which
serves to instill a spurious sense of self-control over the human
condition. 2
52. Roberto Unger is probably responsible for much of the insensitivity that CLS members have
displayed toward precommitment and sour grapes. Precommitment may naturally emerge as a cogni-
tive "defense mechanism" for long-term, large-scale projects in which -here is likely to be much dis-
persed effort along the way. This dispersion of effort could give the ir..pression that the project has
divaricated from its original course. But, in addition, such a mechanism can be deliberately deployed,
as in the case of a scientist who refuses to give up a theory simply because of a few initial falsifying
instances. As Imre Lakatos has pointed out in arguing against Karl Popper, if scientists regularly
responded to negative feedback by altering their theories, it would be difficult for revolutionary break-
throughs to occur. A scientific revolution is usually based on a theory that was "born refuted," in the
sense that the very conception of evidence did not originally lend itself to interpreting empirical results
in a manner conducive to the theory. Consequently, the would-be revolutionary is advised to stick to
his theory until the falsifications start to become overwhelming. See Lakatos, Falsification and the
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRrrctsM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE
91-199 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970). In contrast to this strategy, consider the following
remark of Unger's:
To engage in [the internal development of our social ideals] self-reflectively you need make
only two crucial assumptions: that no one scheme of association has conclusive authority and
that the mutual correction of abstract ideals and their institutional realizations represents the
last best hope of the standard forms of normative controversy.
R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 18, quoted in Singer, supra note 2, at 65. It would seem that Unger
would have us grant legal facts and legal theories the same status in this dialectical, or (as Rawls
would put it) "reflective equilibrium," process. For reasons analogous to the science case, and not-
withstanding CLS hints to the contrary, it is difficult to see how any sort of radical social change
could come from such epistemic evenhandedness. This is just one of many examples in which Unger
portrays a debate or conflict as consisting of two equally weighted sides. It is little more than a
Hegelian mannerism, but it serves to distort the CLS sense of causation in the social world. Perhaps
the most notorious case concerns "Self" versus "Structure," which has been especially exploited (with
the aid of Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason) by Peter Gabel. See Gabel, Intention and Struc-
ture in Contractual Cultures: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601
(1977). This viewpoint also receives the endorsement of Boyle. See Boyle, supra note 13, at 718-21;
Singer, supra note 2, at 40-45.
For Unger, Gabel, Boyle, and Singer, "Self" and "Structure" (like the correlative "local" and
"global") stand for, respectively, the individual and society-but with a German idealist twist, since
the distinction is drawn entirely from Self's (first-person) standpoint. Consequently, Structure is eve-
rything that limits Self's existence: What is not directly determined by Structure is open for determi-
nation by Self, and vice versa. Now, what is the evidence for the existence of this overbearing Struc-
ture? Unger and the rest seem to rely on only two sources: the uniformity of legal language and the
frequent frustration of Self's interests. What is missing here-and normally present in social scientific
accounts-is a causal explanation for Structure's resistance to Self's initiatives. After all, social struc-
tures may not be so resistant to change if individuals have a competent understanding of how they
work. Short of such an understanding, however, these individuals can easily end up undermining their
own efforts and magnifying the apparent stability of the social structures, by misinterpreting their
ignorance as signs of active social resistance-yet another case of the antirealist reifying what is, in
fact, the product of our cognitive limitations. French sociologist Raymond Boudon has some especially
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Turning finally to consensus formation, we find that there seems to be
no real difference between Singer and Stick, except (so claims Stick) that
Singer misses the fact that Rawls, Dworkin, and the other recent liberal
theorists would agree with Stick and Singer.53 Given the affinity noted
earlier between liberalism and antirealism in general, Stick's conclusion
should not come as a surprise. But (no surprise here either) there are
problems. Here is Richard Bernstein's statement of this viewpoint on con-
sensus, which Singer quotes approvingly:
Democratic politics is an encounter among people with differing
interests, perspectives, and opinions-an encounter in which they
reconsider and mutually revise opinions and interests, both individ-
ual and common. It happens always in the context of conflict, imper-
fect knowledge, and uncertainty, but where community action is nec-
essary. The resolutions achieved are always more or less temporary,
subject to reconsideration, and rarely unanimous. What matters is
not unanimity, but discourse."
Given his opening remarks, Bernstein's conclusion is perverse, if not
downright false. He skirts around a rather obvious fact about consensus
formation, namely, that it functions much as precommitment does-by
binding the will of people who would otherwise proceed in disparate
ways, as factions within the larger "democratic" community. This is cer-
tainly the idea behind having elected representatives who speak on behalf
of an entire constituency. The fact that people continue to go their way,
even against the will of their representative, is at least as much due to the
representative's cognitive inability to monitor what the people are thinking
as to their actually changing their minds. Indeed, the preponderance of
"second-order" ignorance that members of a community have about what
one another thinks accounts for the volatility of public opinion, especially
in democratic societies.55 To think, as Bernstein does, that consensuses are
unstable primarily because of the "first-order" ignorance that people have
about their own future wants and needs is to presume that second-order
ignorance is largely unproblematic, as it can be readily corrected through
face-to-face encounters in the "forum."5 6 As we shall see in the final sec-
wise things to say on these matters. See Boudon, The Logic of Relative Frustration, in RATIONAL
CHOICE, supra note 38, at 171-96.
53. Stick, supra note 2, at 383.
54. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 223, quoted in Singer, supra note 2, at 64.
55. One way in which mass democracies undergo major shifts in opinion without design is by the
spiral of silence, a process familiar to public opinion pollsters. Since people in a democracy presume
that everyone has equal access to the means of communication, the opinions openly expressed tend to
be taken as representative of the ones actually held. Consequently, if a dominant position is attacked
by a fairly vocal minority, and no response is forthcoming, support will start to shift from the domi-
nant to the minority position. See E. NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE (1982). John
Maynard Keynes famously noted a similar tendency in stock market speculations. J. KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INVESTMENT, AND MONEY 147-64 (1964).
56. Some scholars have suggested that the very idea of a consensus is a myth. See B. FAY, CRrr-
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tion of this Comment such a presumption is both epistemically and politi-
cally wrong-headed.
V. CONCLUSION: REALISM AND POLITICAL METATHEORY
What, if any, are the implications of scientific realism for the evaluation
of political theories? This is the question of metatheory, to which I now
turn. First, we need to reclaim irrationalism from Singer's antirealism,
which is most evident in the four aims of political reform to which he
would apply legal means.57 The four aims-to prevent cruelty, to alleviate
misery, to democratize hierarchies, and to eliminate loneliness-are unob-
jectionable in their own right, even admirable. What is objectionable,
however, is Singer's apparent assumption that because CLS has shown
that legal decisionmaking is not governed by determinate rules, it follows
that legislators and judges can deliberately bring into existence a consen-
sually desirable social order. Admittedly, this assumption seems rather
innocuous-that is, until we consider that certain sorts of outcomes are
rendered less likely, and perhaps even impossible, when pursued as delib-
erate goals. Only a trenchant sense of social antirealism would claim as a
general principle, "where there's a will, there's a way" or "the direct
route is the best route." Moreover, as I shall now sketch, this sense of
social antirealism has been historically informed by a fear of human cog-
nitive fallibility. 8
Take Aristotle's original conception of political rationality, phronesis,
of which so much has been made in recent years by Gadamer, Habermas,
CAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 165-202 (1987). Thompson has argued that recent studies in public discourse
suggest that societies coalesce, not around values or ideas, but around contained areas of disagreement.
Thompson's conclusion is that the glue binding societies together is, in short, the acceptance of dissen-
sus. J. THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 5.
Even if we were to grant the appropriateness of the Athenian forum as the model for consensus
formation in mass democracy, there would still be the question of the "epistemic rights" of the partici-
pants. See infra note 62. R. RORTY, supra note 12, runs together three incompatible ways of allocat-
ing epistemic rights:
(1) Equal-Time Liberalism: The doctrine that efforts should be taken to ensure that all parties to
the conversation are always on the same footing, no matter what transpires in the course of the
conversation, even if it includes a radical change in the attitudes that the parties have toward one
another.
(2) Separate-but-Equal Liberalism: The doctrine that since a viewpoint is valid for the culture
from which it arose but invalid (or at least inappropriate) for any other culture, it follows that efforts
should be taken to protect the viewpoint of a culture from extra-cultural interference.
(3) Equal-in-Principle Liberalism: The doctrine that since all viewpoints are "created equal," in
the sense that none has any a priori advantage over the rest, it follows that whatever success that
particular viewpoints turn out to have in history will be solely the result of their having adapted to
contingencies in the marketplace of ideas.
Unger is generally as vague as Rorty on these matters, though at one point he says that political
empowerment is designed to recover the liberal ideal (most clearly associated with the marketplace) of
all social interests bearing an equal burden of risk. R. UNGER, supra note 46, at 102.
57. Singer, supra note 2, at 66-70.
58. The following historical account is taken in large measure from F. HAYEK, NEW STuDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 72-97 (1978).
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and Bernstein. 9 It is common nowadays to construe phronesis as the
open-textured rules that enable the play of political language games in a
community. The sense of openness that Aristotle reserved for politics had
less to do with its status as a social construction than as an activity whose
complexity made its practitioners prone to error. Moreover, cognitive
safety was not to be found in political numbers, since Aristotle's concep-
tion of public opinion, doxa, was expressly defined in terms of its fallibil-
ity (but also its corrigibility). All this changed, however, at the start of the
modern era, when philosophers began to collapse the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between a divine order that people "found" (cosmos) and a human
order that was "constructed" (taxis). Consequently, as in the case of
Hobbes's social contract theory, it was no longer presumed that order
would exist in the world without explicit human intervention.
It should perhaps come as no surprise that once humans started acquir-
ing qualities formerly reserved for God, philosophers became dissatisfied
with simply learning to work around, and perhaps partially alleviate,
human fallibility. Rather, fallibility had to be denied, or at least infallible
domains of reasoning had to be found. Descartes expressed this dissatis-
faction most famously in his search for rational foundations for knowl-
edge, but by the eighteenth century it had made its way into political
theory. The route required the following turns:
(1) Descartes' argument, "I think therefore I am," was widely
taken to imply that if there is any knowledge at all, there is self-
knowledge.
(2) The most reliable form of self-knowledge does not involve ref-
erence to anything outside the self, such as physical causes and
effects, which could be subject to manipulation from an unknown
source.
(3) Thus, the most likely candidate for an infallible domain of
reasoning would issue in judgments of one's own self-generated
desires.
(4) The aggregation of these infallible judgments would itself be
infallible and thereby provide the most legitimate basis for decisive
social action.
This line of reasoning was embodied in Rousseau's volont gnrale and
was eventually used to legitimate the French Revolution of 1789. As an
argument, the reasoning is flawed by the fallacy that just because you
know what you want, it does not follow that what you want will turn out
as you expect. I have already suggested that Singer may be guilty of this
fallacy. However, making the charge stick on anyone these days is a tricky
business, given the often self-fulfilling character of democractic political
59. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 171-232 (discussing Gadamer and Habermas).
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reasoning. For example, such terms as volont g' nrale and vox populi
are often used indiscriminately for both a state of knowledge (of what The
People want) and a state of power (to bring about what The People
want), especially when the particular political theorist wants to justify the
use of any means, for as long as it takes, to bring about the desired ends.
Under those conditions, the failure of expectations to match intentions
simply means that more force needs to be applied. 0 Such is the extent to
which humans have gone to avoid admitting that their political knowledge
is as fallible as their scientific knowledge.
In contrast, the political metatheory of irrationalism that I am propos-
ing originated with Machiavelli and culminated at the turn of the century
with the work of Georges Sorel, Vilfredo Pareto, and Roberto Michels.61
Its fundamental precept is that no political theory or program should be
accepted unless it somehow takes into account the cognitive liabilities of
the large numbers of people who would function as governors and gov-
erned. Although irrationalism is traditionally seen as postulating uncon-
scious emotive mechanisms, so-called passions or instincts, as responsible
for these liabilities, this aspect of the metatheory has not been as systemat-
ically developed as its general skepticism toward the efficacy of delibera-
tive reasoning as a political medium in large heterogeneous democratic
societies. In the first attempt to carve out a modern sense of politics,
Machiavelli realized that the two classical instruments of power, coercion
and persuasion, would not work without substantial modification. Coer-
cion would not work because developments in the art and artifacts of war-
fare have enabled disputing parties, with the help of minor miscalcula-
tions, to annihilate each other. But neither would persuasion work, for
democracies are dominated by competing factions that ultimately respond
to mutually incompatible arguments. Moreover, there would never be suf-
ficient closure on debate for policy decisions to be made, if the Athenian
forum were reproduced en masse so as to permit people the opportunity to
weigh the merits of the respective interests.
For better or worse, manipulation turned out to be the Machiavellian
via media between the inadequacies of coercion and persuasion. However,
60. Georges Sorel was a student of the opposite and equally pernicious tendency, which also
nicely captures the cycle of sour grapes-and-precommitment. See supra text accompanying note 51.
This is the fallacy of optimism, whereby initial success leads to a lessening of force. In the give-and-
take of democratic polities, it is common for a party to interpret a minor legislative victory as vindicat-
ing its general policies, and then to follow up this alleged vindication, not advancing by legislative
proposals more central to a party's platform, but by advocating measures intended to appease the
opposition parties. While leaders of the victorious party like to make it seem as though they act this
way out of a democrat's sense of noblesse oblige, such behavior also conveniently prevents any clear
test of the party's mandate. See G. SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE (1912). Singer's obliviousness
to the way that intentions, expectations, and outcomes feed on each other is clear from his discussion
of "ends." Singer, supra note 2, at 61-62.
61. A good account of the intellectual and cultural context of these threefin de sicle Machiavel-
lians is H. HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL
THOUGHT, 1890-1930, at 161-82, 249-77 (1958).
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by treating irrationalism as political metatheory, we need not so much
endorse Machiavelli's own politics as the considerations that he took to be
necessary for framing an adequate politics. And it is in this light that we
should once again consider the efficacy of deliberative reasoning in con-
temporary democracies.
One great liberal who has been conspicuously absent from the recent
debates over legal theory is John Stuart Mill, perhaps the staunchest de-
fender of rational deliberation as a political medium in the modern period.
However, unlike Rorty, Bernstein, and other members of "the conversa-
tion of mankind" school of politics, Mill did not defend deliberation pri-
marily by appeal to freedom of expression, human rights, or other edify-
ing grounds.62 Rather, Mill made the classical argument that rational
deliberation in an open forum promotes the mutual criticism of claims,
which is the most efficient means of eliminating undesirable or otherwise
inoperable proposals, which in turn improves the actions taken by both
the individual and the state. In short, Mill presented a model of politics as
inquiry, with the common good playing the role of truth. More interesting
from a metatheoretic standpoint, however, is that Mill has provided a the-
ory based on empirically testable claims about the ideal modes of produc-
ing and distributing knowledge in liberal democracies.63 As such, it is
open to the realist inquiry raised in this paper and the uncomfortable
answers that are likely to result.
62. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 2 (1859). The great need for political "conversation" felt by Bern-
stein, Rorty, Dworkin, Singer, Stick, and CLS may be seen as the result of the Platonic ideal of social
harmony having been filtered through antirealism. A characteristic statement is Boyle, supra note 13,
at 762-78.
As Rorty has pointed out, see R. RORTY, supra note 12, at 264, the idea of rehabilitating lost
voices in "the conversation of mankind" was introduced by the cultural conservative Michael
Oakeshott in the context of accrediting poetry as a "mode of experience" on equal footing with philos-
ophy, science, history, and the other disciplines. M. OAKESHOTT, supra note 21.
From a realist standpoint, this would seem to confuse the rights that people have as political agents
with their rights as epistemic agents. As epistemic agents, people have the right to a fair test of their
beliefs, but not a right to have those beliefs entertained in perpetuity, even if they are beliefs about the
political status of the epistemic agents. Indeed, the possibility of eliminating error was the big advan-
tage that John Stuart Mill saw in conducting politics in an open forum. The failure to sort out
political from epistemic rights is also evident in the CLS tendency, most pronounced in Boyle and
Unger, to take the subjective experience of social dislocation and objectivist theories of social order as
being on an irreducibly equal epistemic footing. In contrast, a realist would want to account for the
phenomena to which each perspective has special access without necessarily having to endorse the
epistemic status of either (and certainly not of both).
63. The more left wing followers of Karl Popper have long noted Mill's epistemic politics. W.
ALBURY, THE POLITICS OF OBJECTIVITY (1983); P. FEYERABEND, PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICISM 65-79
(1981). Interestingly, Singer cites Mill only once, and for other purposes, see Singer, supra note 2, at
16 n.46, while Stick the liberal does not mention Mill at all.
